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When you receive this issue of the New England Journal of Public Policy, we
should be crossing the threshold from millennium mania to millennium madness.
The former has concerned itself almost exclusively with the etiquette of millennium
rites, where one ought to be on the occasion itself— embracing the starlit grandeur of
the ancient pyramids, as if to remind ourselves that some things preceded the outgoing
millennium and even exceeded the achievements of our own: in the silence of a Tibetan
monastery to contemplate in serenity the philosophical implications of the momentous
transition and reflect perhaps on the meaning of life itself, the imponderables of the
seamlessness of eternity, the indivisibility of a universe that continues to confound our
attempts to unravel its mysteries, or, as members of the less esoteric masses, part of world-
wide revelries linked by satellite feeds that promise little more than massive hangovers
on the first day of the new millennium.
Millennium specials abound, all customer-designed to ensure that all wishes, fanta-
sies, daydreams, and whatever exotics can be squeezed onto the millennium smorgas-
bord of the once-in-a-lifetime experience can be accommodated. Want to be on the re-
mote island where the last sunset of the millennium will occur? No problem. Want to be
on the even more remote island where the first sunrise of the new millennium will occur?
No problem. Want the right champagne? Problem: there's been a run on the stuff for over
a year. Want to make a reservation at a restaurant that specializes in
once-in-a-thousand-years menus? Problem: you should have made that reservation back
in 1998. Want to have a drink at your local watering hole? Problem: bartenders the world
over, it seems, want to join the inebriated mobs, not cater to them. In New York, we are
told, even at guaranteed rates of $600 for bartending on the night plus the lavish tips one
could expect from the rollicking throngs, there are few takers. Having a boisterous time
is more important than seeing that other people are enjoying one.
The lists are being compiled: lists of the millennium best and worst in every conceiv-
able category of human endeavor. Endless treatises are being written on the meaning of it
all. Pundits scold themselves on the redundancy of their punditry while happily trotting
out reams of the redundancies they bemoan as irrelevant: was Attila the Hun really worse
than Genghis Khan? Or would Adolf Hitler put them both to shame? (These comparisons
are not meant to slight Josef Stalin, who certainly has a place on anyone's list of the best
— or worst— mass killers of the period.)
But these are considerations and concerns that pertain to our world: the world of the
"haves," the world of the privileged few who comprise less than 20 percent of the world's
population and consume more than 80 percent of the world's output.
As a species we haven't particularly distinguished ourselves in the last ten centuries,
but then again, in terms of evolution and the endless elasticity of the boundaries of time
and space, one thousand years is merely a blip on a continuum that has no beginning
and no end, too short a time to attach the significance with which we have endowed it.
Padraig O 'Malley is a seniorfellow at the John W. McCormack Institute ofPublic Affairs,
University ofMassachusetts Boston.
New England Journal of Public Policy
But we do have one singular achievement to our credit. We have — through pure dent
of obstinate persistence in the face of formidable obstacles, tenacity of almost unendur-
able proportions, dedication that goes far beyond the call of any duty, sacrifice that turns
the concept itself on its head— managed to perfect the means to obliterate ourselves,
not just once but hundreds of times over.
We can make time and space meaningless. In achieving the capacity to annihilate
every living thing, we have eliminated the need for a Higher Being, for a God who is the
custodian of our lonely existence in the vastness of an infinitely expanding universe.
Fallible in all things, we have engineered infallibility at the cost of our ceasing to be.
With no memory traces of our existence as receptacles of our having ever been here, we
have managed to make life itself an illusion— and we have the conjurers to perform the
final act. Only we would not know it to be so.
Memories are not for the present; they are artifacts that allow us to put
conceptualizations of the future into some rational context. But rationality is predicated
on the assumption that some actions are contrary to our genetically ingrained instincts
for self-preservation. We can no longer cling to this comforting assumption. Since the
appurtenances of universal self-destruction are proliferating, and we continue in our
quest to find ever more refined and cost-effective ways to exterminate ourselves (irratio-
nal?), we have come to the end of history — not in the manner Francis Fukuyama envis-
ages in The End of History and the Last Man, but in our ability to eliminate self and
consciousness of being. History requires memory; with the eradication of memory there
is no history. The termination of all life, now or in the coming millennium, terminates all
preceding life. It is not a matter of closing the book, but of the book never having been
written.
But less of the theology of oblivion, and back to the more mundane. If somehow in
the next millennium we manage to navigate the circumstances of our continued exist-
ence as a species, we will face one overriding challenge that will, if not met, make that
navigation more difficult, given the capacity of even the most meager among us to ac-
quire the means of mutually assured self-extermination.
That challenge is to bring about a more equitable distribution of income and wealth
both within countries and between countries, especially between the countries in the
northern and southern hemispheres. To our everlasting discredit, there is little evidence
that, on a relative basis, we have done much to alleviate disparities of well-being be-
tween rich and poor during the millennium about to close — although I emphasize the
word relative.
Increasingly, we live in a world of the "haves" and the "have-nots." If the issues of the
growing imbalances between north and south and the intolerable burdens of debt with
which countries in the southern hemisphere, especially Africa, are overwhelmed or not
addressed, the anger, resentment, and sheer desperation that have been smoldering in
these countries for decades — centuries in many cases — will ignite into a conflagration
of hostility and animosity with unforeseeable and, perhaps, uncontrollable consequences
— consequences far removed from the small gestures of impotence that have character-
ized their pleas for help in the past.
Tired of being perpetual supplicants, feeling isolated in the global economy with its
dog-eat-dog ideology, forever having to sanction severe and often counterproductive
conditions donor countries and international agencies attach to loans, the poor countries
in the south feel abandoned, not part of the global village we love to meander on about
but inhabitants of the squatter camps that surround it. Marginalized and forgotten, they
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arc not in a forgiving mood. Living on the scraps of the world's wealth their well-to-do
northern neighbors throw in their direction, they would rather suffer in dignity than
swallow silently the humiliations that in the end leave them no belter off.
Even in the United States, there is a creeping recognition that something has gone
awry. After enjoying an unprecedented period of uninterrupted prosperity during the
nineties, with no end to the boom in sight and a stock market that has hit levels no trader
in his wildest dreams would have imagined ten years ago, the distortions that the
market-driven economy has produced are beginning to undermine some of the funda-
mental tenets that made America the beacon of hope, the land of opportunity for millions
in the past.
According to figures released by a number of federal agencies and research organiza-
tions, weekly wages for the average American are 12 percent below their inflation-ad-
justed levels of 1973; median family household income in 1999 is, in real terms, about
the same as it was in 1989; the one percent of the country's highest income earners make
more than what 100 million workers earn; the average working week has expanded to
forty-seven hours, which, for the average middle-income family, translates into an addi-
tional nine weeks of work annually. But the real pay for the extra hours worked comes to
a meager $2.20.
The richest one percent of American households retain 40 percent of the country's
wealth. That is double the percentage of wealth they held in 1976. The bottom 40 per-
cent of Americans experienced a collapse of 80 percent in their net worth. The figures on
debt burden just get worse, leading Lester Thurow, a professor at the MIT Sloan School
of Management to write, "The great American middle class has become a non-participant
in the American dream." One wonders where that leaves those not fortunate enough to
fall into that class — once aspired to by tens of millions, now a debt trap.
Millennium madness refers to increasing concerns about possible Y2K glitches. Even
as evidence mounts that the probabilities of serious glitches are minimal, concerns con-
tinue to increase. All may be well in the United States, but what about the rest of the
world into which this country is wired? And since perceptions are everything, and people
are more prone to believe that more things will go haywire than the government and the
private sector would lead them to believe— who after all wants to cry fire in a crowded
theater and raise the specter of panic, a mad rush for the nearest exit?— they are more
likely to put their eggs in more than one basket, which, of course, leaves open the possi-
bility that we might run out of baskets.
This issue of the New England Journal of Public Policy covers a range of public
policy subjects, all pertinent to the direction federal- and state-level government will
take in the coming decades. I draw your attention to two in particular, not because they
deserve any special signaling out because of superior merit, but because each addresses
the issue of personal character and public life, already the focus of the 2000 presidential
campaign. Richard Hogarty, in his essay on the legacy of Francis Sargent, who served as
governor of Massachusetts from 1969 through 1975, prefaces his narrative with an epi-
graph from David McCullough: "History reminds us that nothing counterfeit has any
staying power, an observation, incidentally, made by Cicero about 60 B.C. [in a pre-
millennium era, to keep things in perspective!]. History teaches that character counts.
Character above all."
This same epigraph would make an ironic preface to Garrison Nelson's essay on the
late Speaker of the House John W. McCormack, one of the major architects of both
Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal and Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society. The irony is
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that according to the norms of today's custodians of the politically correct, McCormack
would not have been judged fit to run for dogcatcher. Nelson also raises a more intrigu-
ing question: What is character?
If, perchance, the next issue of the NewEngland Journal of Public Policy does not
reach you, you may take it that we at the McCormack Institute fell afoul ofY2K. In this
event, your copy, written in longhand, will be hand-delivered in due course — that is, if
we can find anyone who remembers how to write! ^
